For centuries, the creation of markets has been one of the main drivers of economic development. There is one activity, however, in which the formation of markets has not been as smooth as elsewhere. Technologies have normally been embodied in goods and services, and markets for technologies disembodied from them have not been very common. This is epitomized by the Schumpeterian legacy, which suggests that R&D is most often the business of relatively large firms which integrate the search for innovation with production and marketing assets.
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the creation of markets has been one of the main drivers of economic development. There is one activity, however, in which the formation of markets has not been as smooth as elsewhere. Technologies have normally been embodied in goods and services, and markets for technologies disembodied from them have not been very common. This is epitomized by the Schumpeterian legacy, which suggests that R&D is most often the business of relatively large firms which integrate the search for innovation with production and marketing assets.
One stream of the literature has noted that the development of new technologies, typically the R&D process, is marked by uncertainty and other transaction costs that make market-mediated contracts 1 for technology exchange highly incomplete. Application of the theory of the firm by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) then suggests that vertical integration, and the authority that it confers, can help solve the problems of opportunistic behaviour that arise under incomplete contracting. This paper is motivated by a few observations. First, as discussed in the work that Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri, and I have carried out on this topic (Arora et al., 2001a) , the 1990s have witnessed an expansion of technology trade among independent organizations compared to the previous decades. Second, while the literature on technology contracting has focused on one perspective, viz. the inability to write effective contracts for technology trade, there is another well-known feature of technology as an asset. Most notably, the production of new technological designs, principles, or ideas, commands a high fixed cost; or, which amount to the same thing, designs, principles, or ideas are potentially public goods, which can be re-used for different purposes. Thus, as the transaction costs that limit the functioning of the markets for technology are made less severe, technology can be sold to many downstream user firms with relatively small adaptation costs. This gives rise to the classical benefits of industrywide division of labour (Stigler, 1951) .
Specifically, the paper argues that markets for technology help address three market failures: (i) excessive R&D duplications; (ii) externalities in the production of potentially public R&D outcomes; and (iii) deviation from marginal cost pricing in the final good markets. It also argues that markets for technology bring about new failures, particularly: (a) deviation from marginal cost pricing in the upstream technology markets; and (b) new externalities associated with complementary R&D investments made by the buyer and the supplier firms that operate in these markets. In addition, I discuss how the higher returns to R&D associated with wider markets induce the technology suppliers to produce more 'generic' technologies, which can further enhance the returns to innovation.
The next section provides some background about the markets for technology. Section III discusses the contractual limitations associated with technology trade. Section IV provides some examples that illustrate the functioning of the markets for technology, while section V explores in more detail the market failures mentioned above. Section VI looks at the incentives of the technology suppliers to produce more general technologies. Section VII concludes by discussing some policy implications.
II. BACKGROUND
Markets for technology are not a new phenomenon. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999) have offered a detailed account of an extended market for patents in the USA in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They show that, as with any new market, the market for patents was greatly encouraged by the development of supporting institutions. For example, many lawyers became active in finding buyers for patents and related technologies, and in connecting demand and supply-especially in areas where the inventive activity was pronounced. The patent system itself was a critical supporting institution, because it provided a clear and recognized right to inventions, and diffused information about them. Information was not only diffused directly, but also through journals, such as Scientific American, which started publishing information on new patents and the technology development that they represented.
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff also discuss the decline of the markets for patents around the 1920s, when the inventors became employed in the R&D laboratories of the larger corporations. Many inventors, including successful ones, faced increasing difficulties in finding the financial sources to develop their prototypes, especially because the twentieth-century technologies had become more complex and the innovations costlier to develop. This intensified asymmetric information and related problems between inventors and prospective financiers, and it convinced many scientists to accept stable employment relationships in larger firms that ensured greater financial security. R&D labs inside the large corporations then became the typical organization of the inventive process of the post-war period.
By using systematic data on technology transactions in Arora et al. (2001a) , we found, however, that the extent of technology trade has grown in the 1990s, and high-tech industries such as software, chemicals, semiconductors, and electronics have led this growth. Moreover, there has been an explosion of new and different forms through which technology transactions among independent organizations have taken place, ranging from pure licensing, to several kinds of R&D collaborations, equity financing, etc. In our book, we estimated that the value of the total technology transactions is about 9 per cent of total non-defence R&D spending in the developed countries. The potential expansion of technology trade is even more notable. For example, the European Patent Office estimated that, in Europe, US$20 billion are spent every year to develop innovations and technologies that have already been developed elsewhere (see Arora et al., 2001a) . Teece (1988) argues that one reason why marketbased contractual mechanisms for procuring innovation services have been severely underdeveloped is that they entail at least three sources of transaction costs. First, in the case of R&D and innovation it is hard to provide detailed specifications of the task requirements at the outset of the process. These specifications can be defined more precisely only while undertaking the process. This implies that contracts for technology services are largely incomplete, and this leaves either party open to opportunistic behaviour by the other. Second, if a company develops tight interactions with one technology supplier, the interplay of relationships may generate sunk costs, which may give rise to switching costs and lock-in problems. Finally, releasing pre-contract information to bidders may require the companies to share valuable proprietary information, and this increases the risk that competitors will discover their R&D plans.
III. CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS IN THE MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY
Teece concludes that vertical integration is the natural solution to the problems of opportunistic behaviour that arise when contracts are incomplete. In the case of innovation, this means that the firm can specify and organize the actions of the various agents involved in the innovation process while the process takes place. Integration has other benefits as well. For example, being part of the same organization helps the various specialists inside the firm to acquire a better understanding of each other's problems and needs, to share common objectives and beliefs, and to adopt a common language. Aghion and Tirole (1994) have generalized Teece's argument. They develop a model that determines the conditions under which the property rights on the invention are given to the firm that will use it to manufacture and commercialize the new products (integration) or they are retained by the research unit that carries out the invention (technology trade).
In their model, the technology producer and the user have to undertake complementary investments to enhance the value of the technology. The problem is that because of the incompleteness of the contracts, the effort of the research unit is hard to monitor and to contract ex ante, as Teece noted. As a result, the first best cannot be achieved.
However, their model suggests that there are conditions under which technology trade between independent parties does take place, and it is efficient compared to integration. In particular, the property rights on the invention will be given to the research firm when the marginal effect of its non-contractable effort on the pay-off of the customer firm is large enough to make it higher than when the manufacturer retains the property rights. The intuition is that when the research unit owns the invention, its payoff will be linked to the value of the invention. This motivates it to undertake extra efforts to increase the value of the invention. By contrast, the inventor will not be motivated to exert the extra effort if he or she is integrated inside the manufacturer and is paid an 'average' salary not linked to the productivity of research. This is suggestive, for instance, of why today we observe market-mediated exchange of technologies in high-tech industries, such as biotechnology, software, or semiconductors, where the impact of the effort exerted by the smaller hightech technology suppliers is quite important for the pay-off of the firms that use these technologies.
IV. FUNCTIONING OF THE MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY
The contractual theory of the firm has then focused on the benefits of technology trade that arise because of the incentives produced by the ownership of the property rights on the non-contractable effort of the inventor. Here I want to highlight that the markets for technology can help solve other important inefficiencies which do not depend on unobservables and incentives, but on the underlying cost structure of the technologies.
I start with some examples. In the chemical industry technology licensing has been common for many years. Many chemical producers which also operate in the downstream markets sell their technologies to other chemical manufacturers. One reason for licensing is that the licensor does not find it convenient to operate with its own production in the final markets controlled by the licensee. This is typically the case for international licences. But there are many instances in which the chemical companies cross-license their technologies to each other, or simply license to other producers to earn licensing royalties. The distinction between whether the companies license to others because they seek royalties, or because they are unable to exploit the technology themselves in the 'distant' markets of the other producers, can be blurred. The important point, however, is that for one reason or another this industry has been active in technology licensing for many years (Arora et al., 2001a) .
As noted in section II, technology licensing has become an increasingly common strategy in other high-tech industries as well. In semiconductors, Grindley and Teece (1997) and Hall and Ham (2001) documented a significant increase in the licensing revenues of some leading companies during the 1990s. For example, Texas Instruments instituted a new active licensing strategy in 1985, which increased its royalty earnings from less than US$50m in 1986 to more than US$500m in the mid1990s. Similarly, IBM increased its licensing royalties from about US$100m in 1990 to almost US$1 billion in 1999 (Rivette and Kline, 2000) . Not only have licensing royalties increased in many other leading international companies in chemicals, electronics, and other sectors, but there is evidence that in the 1990s many of these companies instituted special internal divisions concerned specifically with the licensing of their technologies.
A special, but important, case of markets for technology is when the technology suppliers are specialized upstream producers of the technologies that do not operate in the downstream product markets. Rosenberg (1963) provides a classical example. In the nineteenth century the firearms industry in the USA grew enough to spin off an upstream industry specialized in the production of metal-working machine tools. This followed from the fact that the metal-cutting operations, and hence the design requirements of the machines, were similar across firms. As a result, the machine-tool producers could spread the fixed costs of designing the new machines over a relatively large output. The opportunities to exploit the same basic technologies extended even beyond the firearms industry. Later on, when the bicycle industry emerged, it turned out that, in spite of its substantially different final products, it required metal-working operations, and corresponding machines, that were similar to those used by the firearms sector. Likewise, subsequent industries (sewing machines, or even the automobile industry in the twentieth century) all employed metal-working machines and related tools whose structures, design, operations, and, above all, technology, had developed in a cumulative fashion from the very same origins and competencies. Rosenberg labelled this phenomenon 'technological convergence' (see Figure 1 ).
Technological convergence implied that the set-up costs to develop the new designs did not have to be incurred repeatedly by each downstream firm. Moreover, the upstream sector facilitated the entry of other firms and, as noted above, it facilitated the rise of new industries. Figure 2 illustrates this point. As in the top chart of the figure, the production of the technology exhibits declining average costs. When a second-comer industry (e.g. bicycles) or a second-comer firm enters, its market is small, i.e. it is equal to Q B in Figure 2 . This implies that the cost of producing the technology internally is c B . However, the industry features a first-comer industry (e.g. the firearms sector) or firm, which has already reached a sizeable market, Q A in the figure, with implied average cost c A . If the technology can be re-used for the needs of the newcomer industry or firm, then the latter can take great advantage of the learning process that had been accumulated by the firstcomer. In particular, the new industry or firm can buy the technology from the existing suppliers (whether the incumbent industry or the incumbent firms themselves, or an industry of specialized technology producers, such as the machine-tool suppliers) whose average cost of producing the technology had moved along the declining average This story equally applies across countries rather than across sectors. In Arora et al. (2001b) (see also Arora et al., 2001a) we studied an important sector of specialized technology suppliers, the socalled specialized engineering firms (SEFs) that originated in the first world, and that, at least since the 1930s, had supplied process technologies to the oil and chemical producers in the advanced countries. In the 1970s the SEFs became key suppliers of process technologies to the domestic chemical and oil companies in the less-developed countries (LDCs) as well. The opportunity arose because, while an ammonia plant in the USA or in Europe is a different object from an ammonia plant in India, the basic principles of how an ammonia plant should be designed and engineered remain the same. This meant that in the LDCs the SEFs could exploit the long-standing technological learning that they had accumulated for many years in the first world. Thus, while in the 1970s the emerging markets for chemical fertilizers in the LDCs was still small, the SEFs were operating well down the average cost curve of the technology because the small LDC markets was on top of the larger market for fertilizers that had developed in the first world for many years. By using a rich data base on investments in chemicalprocessing industries worldwide, we obtained evidence that in markets where the SEFs from the first world were present, there were greater investments in chemical plants by LDC firms. The argument is again that in Figure 2. 2 One could ask whether this process is peculiar to technology, or if it is common to any kind of capital goods. It is more general. However, technology is the component of the capital goods that is more portable and re-useable at low cost. For example, the machines used by the bicycle industry were most likely customized to the specific needs of that industry, and in this respect they were adapted from the firearms industry. Yet, what remained mostly unchanged, and of which the related fixed cost need not be replicated, were the basic technological principles and the technological learning that had developed for many years in the firearms sector. 
V. EXTERNALITIES AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS
To illustrate how the markets for technology can help address the market failures suggested in the introduction, as well as the new failures that they can give rise to, I employ a simple model inspired by the more fully specified model developed by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) about the implications of the growth of general-purpose technologies. Suppose that there are N identical firms in a market which produce their final output using a technology input indexed by q = (1/α)·x α ·z 1-α , where 0<α<1, x is the quantity of the input, and z is its 'quality'. To produce this technology input, the firms incur costs equal to c per unit of x, and a convex cost function of improving the technological quality which we simplify to (1/2)·z
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. Take π to be the price-cost margin in the downstream final market. Each firm will then choose x and z to maximize its profits
where the subscript I denotes profits under 'integration'. It is not hard to see that the optimal levels x I and z I are, respectively, x I = (π/c) . By substituting x I and z I into (1), we obtain the optimal profits
Suppose now that the technology quality z is a potentially public good in the sense that z can be produced by one firm, and simply re-used by the others. Consider the case in which only one firm produces x (which embodies quality z), and sells it to all the other firms at a price w per unit of x. We use subscripts 1 and 2 to denote, respectively, the technology supplier firm and the other firms. The profits of these firms are
where the last term of (2) denotes the total rent earned by the licensor from selling the technology to the other (N-1) companies. Both types of firms will first choose their optimal demand for x. This yields This last is an important point. Most notably, the external supply of the common technology input is what makes the pay-offs of the firms interdependent. The implication is that while there are no spillovers in the integration regime, the intermediation of the technology supplier creates the positive association between the pay-off of the firms and the number of technology users.
In comparing the two industry structures, it turns out, however, that the total industry profits under the two configurations-viz. N·Π I versus Π 1 + (N-1)·Π 2 -cannot be unambiguously compared a priori. However, it can be shown that, as N increases, the latter expression increases faster than the former, and for N large enough it becomes higher. For the moment we are not affecting the consumer surplus, as we keep the downstream price-cost margins π fixed. Hence, changes in the total industry profits denote genuine welfare improvements. As a result, for N large enough, the industry structure with licensing is superior from the point of view of society's welfare. The intuition is straightforward. First, the production of the technology quality z now exploits its public nature by letting only one firm produce it. It is not difficult to see that, for N large, not only do the total industry profits under licensing become larger than those under integration, but also the total industry costs to produce z-viz. (N/2)·(z I ) 2 versus (1/2)·(φ·z I ) 2 -become smaller with licensing. The structure with licensing then produces higher welfare, and it avoids excessive duplications of R&D costs. Second, the structure with licensing implies that the licensor invests more in R&D than each independent firm under the integration regime because he or she takes into account the benefits produced by their investments in z on the demand for the technology input x 2 by the other firm. This is apparent in (2), as the licensor will maximize profits Π 1 by taking into account the impact of z on the demands for x 2 by the other (N-1) firms. In short, the licensor internalizes one externality associated with the public nature of basic technologies that was not internalized under the integration regime.
But why is the licensing regime not implying unambiguous welfare improvements even for small N? If the opportunity arises from the spreading of the fixed costs of producing technology, these benefits should take place as soon as N > 1. The problem is that the licensing regime introduces one failure that did not exist with integration. Under integration the 'quantity' of the technology produced, viz. x, was produced by all the firms at marginal costs c. With licensing, x is no longer produced at marginal cost. As Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) note, in order to encourage the licensor to invest in the production of the technology, he or she has to be offered some rents. In (2), these are measured by (w-c). Note that if the licensor were forced to price the technology at marginal cost, no rent would be obtained from the licence, and the licensor would not take into account the effects of z on the x 2 's demanded by the licensee. Thus, in order to internalize that externality, society has to undergo another market failure; viz. because each unit of x now costs w > c, the licensee will buy less of it compared to the integrated firms. In turn, because of the complementarity between the demand for x by the licensee and the investments in z by the licensor, the lower demand for x limits the investments in z. For small levels of N, it is not clear which effect dominates-i.e. the internalization of the externality associated with the public nature of z, or the deviation from marginalcost pricing in the market for the technology. However, as N increases, and the generality of z is such that it can be employed by the other firms at low additional costs, the industry-wide cost advantages dominate, and the licensing configuration becomes socially more desirable.
There are a few more concepts to be highlighted. First, the point just made suggests that, other things being equal, markets for technology based on specialized upstream suppliers, with no stakes in downstream markets, are socially less efficient than those in which the licensor is also a downstream producer. In our simplified structure, if the licensor was not a downstream producer, his or her own x, which we labelled x 1 , would also be acquired at unit cost w rather than c. The demand for x 1 would then be lower, with implied negative effect on z. We could then simply conclude that a regime with large chemical manufacturers that are also selling their technologies via licences, would be better than one in which the SEFs or other vertically specialized technology suppliers have no downstream assets. In practice, however, there are countervailing effects. For example, Arora and Fosfuri (1999) argue that even when they license, the downstream manufacturers may not license as extensively as companies with no shares in the final good markets, because the licence could dissipate some of their downstream rents. This cannot be a discouragement effect for the suppliers because they have no stakes in the final markets (see also Arora et al., 2001a) . Second, the very same market for technology generated by the opportunity to license z creates another externality. As Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) point out, with general-purpose technologies such as that epitomized by z in our simple model, the innovation complementarities that are embedded in the actions of the upstream and downstream firms generate other spill-overs. In particular, because of the interdependence in the pay-offs of the user sectors produced by z, shocks to the demand for x by any of the sectors are going to affect the production of z, and through that they are going to affect the demand for x of the other downstream sectors. This externality is not internalized, unless two or more downstream sectors merge and maximize their joint profits.
Finally, the markets for technology reduce the deviation from marginal-cost pricing in the endproduct markets. Suppose that to operate in the final-good markets the firms have to incur a fixed cost F, which is simply subtracted to Π I , Π 1 , and Π 2 . We have seen that for N sufficiently large both Π 1 and Π 2 become higher than Π I . This implies that given F, the licensing-industry structure can sustain a larger number of firms. So far we have assumed that the price-cost margins in the final-good markets, π, do not change. Any theory of competition would suggest that as N increases, they would decrease. By inducing greater entry, markets for technology then reduce the deviation from marginal-cost pricing in the final markets. This is really the story of the bicycle industry or the SEFs discussed earlier. As noted in the previous section, we found, for example, that the SEFs induced greater investments in chemical plants by the domestic firms in the LDCs, and even in the first world they have encouraged the entry of smaller chemical companies. This is said to have been responsible for the fairly high degree of competition that has been observed in the chemical industry, both in the LDCs and in the advanced countries.
There are also negative impacts, however. The demand for x by the application sectors depends on the rents π that they make downstream. As these rents diminish because of competition, the demand for x lowers, which in turn reduces the rents of the technology supplier for producing z. As the technology supplier produces a smaller z, the profits of all the firms diminish, and this may reduce N. The ultimate effect is the net result of these countervailing forces. In fact, one could think of this as a long-term process. As in our stories of the machine-tool industry or the SEFs, the rise of technological suppliers has first increased the number of new entrants, and it has therefore increased competition. With the maturation of the industry, excessive competition may then contribute to reduce the R&D investments, and the number of firms in the market.
VI. MAKING 'GENERALITY' ENDOGENOUS
There is another implication of the markets for technology. It is apparent from the discussion so far, and from the expression of the licensor profits (2), that the licensor has greater incentives to invest in the technology, z, the greater is the number of potential users, N. This suggests that when transaction costs and other limitations to the markets for technology are removed, the technology suppliers have incentives to widen N endogenously by searching for broader and more general technologies.
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Most of the examples that we know of deliberate attempts to produce more general technologies are of vertically specialized technology suppliers with no or very minor operations in the downstream markets. This is not to say that larger downstream manufacturers do not produce general technologies. Yet, the markets for technology are likely to provide greater incentives to do so by the specialized suppliers. The argument is that suggested earlier.
The specialized technology suppliers have no negative impacts on the creation of new potential users of the technology, and hence have greater incentives to seek new applications. By contrast, producers with downstream assets have to be preoccupied with the effects of spreading their technologies on their final good markets as well.
The story of the SEFs in chemicals provides another interesting example of the attempt to produce more general technologies. As discussed in Bresnahan and Gambardella (1998) and in Arora et al. (2001a) , a single SEF, Universal Oil Products (UOP), has been responsible for a number of important inventions in petrochemical processing. Throughout the twentieth century, UOP has acted as the R&D department of many small and independent oil refiners and chemical firms. Even today it sells a number of licences in many oil refining and chemical processing technologies, and in several countries. The very first invention produced by UOP in the 1910s, the first continuous cracking process for producing gasoline, the Dubbs process, is a quintessential example of a general-purpose invention. The value of the Dubbs process was that it could be employed to produce gasoline from any kind of basic oil feedstock, whether high or low quality, while at that time different kinds and grades of the raw material required different process technologies. Most interestingly, the attempt to produce such a general invention came from the fact that the US oil industry of the early twentieth century was very fragmented, and any small town with access to oil had its small refinery. Moreover, the oil extracted in the different places showed significant differences in quality. UOP strategy was then to develop a generalpurpose design that could fit a great number of these potential applications with small adaptation costs.
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Attempts to widen the generality of the technology are of course very common in today's high-tech industries as well. The biotechnology industry provides an interesting example. When this industry first emerged in the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, most of the small start-up firms conceived their strategy as one focused on the intensive rather than extensive margins. Specifically, most of them attempted to develop one or two new products, which they would then have liked to manufacture or even commercialize. In many cases this strategy proved to be unsuccessful, especially because of the significant set-up costs of the pharmaceutical and chemical markets. Some firms then resorted to a licensing strategy; yet the idea was still to focus on the discovery of new compounds, which could then be licensed to larger downstream manufacturers. The problem with this strategy was that these companies were still relying on the opportunities to gain rents on the intensive margins, even though such margins now depended on the scale of operations of their clients rather than their own. But this also had two main shortcomings. First, the discovery of successful new compounds in chemicals and 3
In the previous section, the span of application of z was set by our assumption that the licensor could redeploy z to any other users at the same cost that he or she would incur when investing in z for the first user. This is an extreme case. Most typically, the technology can be adapted to fit new users at an additional cost per user. In Bresnahan and Gambardella (1998) we develop a model where we endogenize the choice of the degree of generality of the technology by allowing the technology suppliers to invest in R&D that reduces the adaptation costs to extra users. A different approach, but with a similar flavour, is that by Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) , who endogenize the R&D spillovers produced by the firms. especially in pharmaceuticals is a rather risky activity, and the risk in this case would be borne entirely by the biotech firms. Second, the large R&D departments of the very same big firms to which the biotech companies sell their discoveries are major competitors of the biotech companies themselves.
By contrast, some biotech companies have followed another path. They realized that a notable potential for their technologies was the supply of biotechnology tools to the large and growing markets of R&D activities in bio-chemicals and bio-pharmaceuticals (large firms, other biotechnology companies, hospital and research labs). These tools are mostly technologies for conducting more efficient laboratory tests, screenings of compounds, tests of the action of a fairly large number of molecules and substances, computerized drug design, and research. These tools typically exploit scientific advances in combinatorial chemistry, genetics, and information technology. Moreover, the trend is clearly towards higher generality of purposes. For instance, there are companies that develop so-called 'gene-chips', which can very quickly test several compounds. Leaders in this market, such as Affymetrix or Nanogen, seek to develop technologies that can be easily rearranged to test for many different drugs or pathologies. Similarly, companies developing the socalled 'labs-on-a-chip', which can perform on a chip various functions normally performed in a laboratory, advertise the superiority of their products by claiming that they can assess several semiconductor design modules. These strategies have paid off. 'Platform' biotech companies seemed to have performed better than 'product' biotech concerns in the mid-1990s (see, for example, Cockburn et al., 1999) .
VII. CONCLUSIONS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our analysis suggests that the net social benefits of the markets for technology can be significant, especially when the public nature of the technologies is exploited over many potential users. This is why policies for reducing transaction costs in technology trade can be important.
Technical standards can help the market for technology in two ways. First, they favour the compatibility among the technologies developed by different users and producers. Second, they make the technologies easier to assess and to define ex ante, which helps in the writing of less ambiguous contracts. Legal standards are also crucial. Standardized contracts for technology exchange can further reduce the ambiguities associated with these types of contracts. As noted in section II, intermediating institutions, and the Patent Office itself, played an important role in reducing asymmetric information and search costs in the nineteenth-century US market for patents. In addition, there is a long literature on the role of financial intermediation in supporting the rise and development of technology companies, such as our technology suppliers. Finally, markets for technology are often underdeveloped simply because, historically, companies have integrated the production of their technologies, and there is no shift to the new industry structure even though it might be beneficial to do so. Standards, creation of intermediating institutions, and shifts to the new equilibrium are all areas that require coordination, which can be directly or indirectly enhanced by policy.
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are another key area for policy in this context. The literature on IPRs is becoming voluminous. Here, I want to highlight one twist of this argument that arises from our discussion. We have seen that the technology suppliers have to be motivated by some licensing rents, which IPRs can, of course, provide. Yet, this comes at the cost of reduced profits and a lower demand for R&D outcomes by the buyer firms. This is the well-known economic dilemma about IPRs; notably, the rents gained by the patent holders are the price that society has to pay in order to encourage them to invest in the first place. The perspective we want to highlight here is that the greater the number of downstream applications (our N in section V), the lower the social penalty produced by the deviation from marginal-cost pricing in the technology markets. Thus, for example, as noted by Arora (1995) (see also Arora et al., 2001a) , stronger IPRs may prove to be beneficial from a social point of view if they help move from a regime of integration to the creation of markets for technology, and this is especially so if there are potentially public and 'generic' components of basic knowledge or technologies.
Finally, our analysis has highlighted some new externalities produced by the markets for technology.
We have seen that innovation complementarities between the technology buyers and sellers make the pay-offs of all the agents in these markets interdependent on one another. As Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) pointed out, this suggests that cooperation among the user firms, or between technology users and producers, whereby they choose their R&D investments to maximize joint profits, will internalize some of these externalities. The interesting paradox is that the wider is the market that these technologies can span, the greater the benefits, but also the unexploited externalities. In other words, the greater the span of applications, the less realistic is the opportunity to engage in widespread cooperation among a very large number of producer and user firms. The point is, however, suggestive of the fact that policy should be more lenient towards R&D cooperation among the firms that could be linked by a common generalpurpose technology, especially if one could separate such cooperation from potential collusion downstream. This is certainly not the first time that these issues have been raised. Markets for technology, however, provide a different perspective about them, notably that of the opportunities-and related policy actions-associated with the exploitation of potentially public knowledge and technologies at the level of entire industries or economies, rather than at the level of the individual firms.
